Key Facts

• Amendment 4 requires consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee before publishing a statement under section 3.
• Amendment 5 mandates notification of the Intelligence and Security Committee before making regulations under specific sections of the Bill.
• The Kraft takeover of Cadbury in 2012 is cited as an example of national responsibility being outsourced to the market.
• Previous Conservative Governments have not adequately addressed national security impacts beyond defence capabilities.
• Amendment 3 would require multi-agency review or IS Committee recommendation before issuing a call-in notice.
• The Bill shifts from 12 reviews in 18 years to potentially 1,830 notifications annually.
• Chi Onwurah emphasizes the importance of multi-agency input for national security decisions.
• Examples mentioned include Huawei and DeepMind's sale to Google in 2014 highlighting past oversight issues.
• The Intelligence and Security Committee, National Cyber Security Centre, MI5, and MI6 are suggested as key agencies.
• The amendment seeks to fill gaps highlighted by expert advice and international precedence.
• It aims to protect security and give businesses confidence in decision-making processes.
• Amendment 4 would require consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee before publishing statements on call-in powers.
• There have been only 12 national security cases under the Enterprise Act since 2002.
• The new legislation may handle almost 2,000 annual cases.
• Regulations under clause 6 would define sectors posing significant national security risks.
• Amendments seek to involve parliamentary scrutiny, specifically by the Intelligence and Security Committee, in defining these sectors.
• There are concerns about potential bottlenecks if additional steps are added to a time-critical process.
• MP Derek Twigg is addressing the Public Bill Committee on the National Security and Investment Bill.
• The discussion revolves around the role of Parliament in scrutinising national security decisions, especially those concerning foreign investment and national security conflicts within departments like BEIS.
• The amendments aim to bring ISC scrutiny to notifiable acquisition regulations before any decision is made.
• Professor Martin, former head of National Cyber Security Centre, suggested that accountability and transparency mechanisms are necessary alongside broad powers.
• Over 1,800 notifications or call-ins are expected annually under the Bill.
• The amendment requires the Secretary of State to assess multi-agency reviews or recommendations before issuing a call-in notice.
• The Government's impact assessment estimates at least 1,000 notifications every year.
• Under Amendment 3, only those leading to a call-in notice would require a review, which is estimated as 90 cases annually.
• Amendment 4 seeks to require the Secretary of State to consult the Intelligence and Security Committee prior to publishing a statement on the exercise of the call-in power.
• Clause 4 requires the Secretary of State to lay the statement before Parliament, which can influence and scrutinise its contents within 40 sitting days.
• Amendment 5 would require notifying the ISC prior to making regulations under clause 6 for mandatory notifications.
• Call-in notices may be issued for acquisitions or control over entities that might pose national security risks.
• The Secretary of State must publish a statement outlining how they intend to use the call-in powers before issuing any notice.
• Clause 1 specifies that nothing in the published statement limits the power of the Secretary of State to issue a call-in notice.
• Amendment 10 aims to enable the Secretary of State to issue multiple call-in notices if material new information is available.
• The amendment would modify subsection (1) of Clause 2.
• Amendment seeks to replace subsection (1) in clause related to call-in notices.
• Current clause states: “No more than one call-in notice may be given in relation to each trigger event.”
• Proposed amendment adds: “unless material new information becomes available within five years of the initial trigger event.”
• The current databases do not cover asset transactions and real estate purchases.
• Dr Ashley Lenihan from LSE highlighted the importance of flexibility for evolving threats from countries like China, Russia, and Venezuela.
• An example given is the unnoticed acquisition by Huawei of assets from a bankrupt US cloud computing company called 3Leaf.
• Five-year time limit for the Secretary of State to spot completed trigger events that may pose a risk to national security.
• Six-month window for issuing a call-in notice once the Secretary of State becomes aware of the trigger event.
• The five-year time limit starts from commencement if the trigger event occurs before but after introduction of the Bill.