<-- Back to proposed bills

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

05 October 2020

Proposing MP
Ribble Valley
Type
Bill Debate

At a Glance

Issue Summary

Nigel Evans discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, which aims to regulate the participation in criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) for national security and law enforcement purposes. The statement addresses concerns regarding the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and its implications on national security and criminal justice. The Minister is addressing concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and its implications on existing practices. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill which amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act to allow public authorities to grant criminal conduct authorisations under certain conditions. James Brokenshire discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, emphasizing the importance of robust oversight mechanisms. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, which aims to regulate the use of covert intelligence sources in specific public authorities. Nick Thomas-Symonds discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, addressing the importance of covert human intelligence sources in protecting national security and preventing crime. The statement addresses concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill's compatibility with human rights conventions. The statement discusses concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, focusing on issues such as gender impact, racial disparities, judicial oversight, and transparency. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and its aim to provide statutory protection for undercover officers. Richard Thomson discusses concerns regarding the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, focusing on safeguards for rights and public support. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, supporting its aim of providing legal protection for sources who help fight terrorism and serious crime. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, focusing on the necessity of authorising covert agents to engage in criminal activities under strict safeguards. The statement addresses concerns about covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) in Northern Ireland and the necessity of state operations that may involve criminal conduct. The debate concerns the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill which aims to regulate the authorisation of criminal activities by intelligence agents. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and its implications for oversight and authorisation procedures. The speaker expresses frustration with the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, considering it a missed opportunity due to its haphazard approach and lack of clear limitations. Bob Neill discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, focusing on the need for precise language regarding pre-authorisation arrangements and concerns about listing organisations such as the Food Standards Agency. MP Nigel Evans discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and its implications for undercover operations. Jeremy Wright discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and addresses concerns about its scope and safeguards. Claire Hanna expresses concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, arguing it could lead to serious abuses and lack of accountability. The statement discusses concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, which provides legal authorization for undercover agents to engage in criminal activities necessary for national security. The statement discusses concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and its implications for authorising criminal conduct. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and its role in providing statutory footing for activities conducted by covert agents. Maria Miller discusses concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill regarding training for agents, guidance from the College of Policing, assessment of policy impact, and pathways for victims' redress. The statement addresses concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, which allows state agents to engage in various criminal activities without proper oversight. The statement addresses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill which aims to provide legal protection for individuals working to disrupt serious crimes and terrorism. The debate discusses concerns about the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill, focusing on issues such as retrospective action, oversight, safeguards, and the potential misuse of powers. The statement discusses the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill and its provisions regarding oversight and safeguards.

Action Requested

The MP proposes that the House reads the Bill a Second time to address concerns about safeguarding national security while maintaining appropriate oversight mechanisms and respecting human rights. He emphasizes the importance of authorizations, proportionality, necessity, and specificity in CHIS operations.

Key Facts

  • The Bill deals with participation in criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources (CHIS).
  • Between November 2018 and 2019, CHIS operations within the Metropolitan police area led to 3,500 arrests, the recovery of over 400 firearms and weapons, seizure of over 400 kg of class A drugs, and recovery of more than £2.5 million in cash.
  • The Bill includes a specific reference to the Human Rights Act.
  • The Bill enables CHIS to continue deploying existing methods without conferring new powers.
  • In December 2019, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal found MI5 has a lawful basis for CHIS participation in criminal activity.
  • The Crown Prosecution Service considers prosecution of properly authorised CHIS as perverse under current regime.
  • The Bill does not have any retrospective effect on past actions.
  • There are ongoing inquiries into issues such as sexual assaults by undercover police officers.
  • Undercover operatives cannot form intimate sexual relationships with those they infiltrate or encounter, and this conduct will never be authorized.
  • The Bill amends RIPA by inserting a new section.
  • CCAs must be necessary and proportionate to achieve statutory purposes: national security, prevention or detection of crime, or economic wellbeing.
  • Authorisations are granted by highly trained officers.
  • A CHIS code of practice provides further detail on the authorisation process.
  • The Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC) conducts wide-ranging inspections of public authorities.
  • Sir Brian Leveson is the current IPC, formerly president of the Queen’s bench division and independent of Government.
  • The IPC sets inspection frequencies and receives unfettered access to documents from public authorities.
  • The Bill lists specific public authorities like intelligence agencies, police, National Crime Agency, armed forces, HMRC, and others who can grant criminal conduct authorisation.
  • These authorities must demonstrate a clear operational need before using the power.
  • The Environment Agency investigates illegal dumping of toxic waste.
  • The Serious Fraud Office investigates complex fraud cases risking public funds.
  • The Food Standards Agency investigates deliberate mislabelling and sale of unsafe food.
  • HMRC tackles money laundering and trafficking of illicit goods.
  • The director general of MI5 has stated that since March 2017, MI5 and Counter Terror Police have thwarted 27 terror attacks.
  • In 2018, covert human intelligence operations by the National Crime Agency disrupted threats to life, arrested serious criminals, seized thousands of kilograms of class A drugs, safeguarded over 200 vulnerable people, and took firearms and rounds of ammunition off the streets.
  • The Bill sets out conditions for authorisations of participation in criminal conduct if it is necessary for national security, preventing or detecting crime, or economic well-being.
  • The statement mentions section 19 certification from the Home Secretary regarding the Bill's compatibility with convention rights.
  • Clause 1 of the Bill includes a reference to the Human Rights Act 1998 in new section 29B(7) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
  • Nick Thomas-Symonds refers to previous IPT judgments and filings that raised concerns about the applicability of the Human Rights Act.
  • The Bill looks to disrupt networks that have gendered impacts.
  • Concerns exist about a disproportionate impact on black, Asian, and other ethnic minority communities.
  • Judges are available 24 hours a day for emergency injunctions in various legal areas.
  • Clause 4(3) amends section 234 of the Investigatory Powers Act to include statistics on use of criminal conduct authorisations in annual reports.
  • The requirement is subject to existing protections in the Investigatory Powers Act for information related to national security.
  • Every single authorisation should be notified to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for ongoing oversight.
  • A complaint can be made to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner regarding these powers.
  • The Minister has assured that the Bill is not retrospective and does not affect legacy issues in Northern Ireland's peace process.
  • There is an ongoing inquiry into undercover policing, chaired by Sir John Mitting, with evidential hearings opening next month.
  • The Bill aims to put existing powers to authorise criminal conduct on an explicit statutory basis.
  • Covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) are described as a key tactic in protecting national security and investigating serious crime.
  • The Intelligence and Security Committee welcomes the principle behind the Bill.
  • The Bill seeks to put covert intelligence gathering on a legal footing.
  • There are concerns about potential conflicts of interest in authorisation processes.
  • Annual reporting is seen as inadequate; real-time or near-real-time reporting is preferred.
  • Explicit prohibitions on actions like murder, torture, and sexual violence are requested.
  • Legal backstops under the ECHR and HRA may not be sufficient for assurance.
  • Covert human intelligence sources provide vital information in saving lives.
  • Clause 4 offers reassurance with significant oversight measures.
  • The Investigatory Powers Commissioner has significant powers for scrutiny and oversight.
  • The ISC strongly supports the principle behind the legislation.
  • The Bill allows security and intelligence agencies to authorise individuals to carry out criminal acts under specific safeguards.
  • Some organisations included in the Bill do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
  • The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report highlights MI5's ongoing work in Northern Ireland.
  • An agent embedded within the New IRA for over a decade was crucial to an operation targeting the New IRA’s army council.
  • There are concerns about threats against agents involved in such operations.
  • Theresa Villiers discusses the case of Pat Finucane killed in 1989.
  • Sir Desmond de Silva concluded that two agents were involved but no overarching state conspiracy existed.
  • David Cameron issued an apology on behalf of the government to the Finucane family.
  • The Bill aims to provide clearer statutory footing for agent criminal activity authorisation.
  • The Bill builds on an already rigorous oversight regime established by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
  • The Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPCO) has a transformative impact on oversight of intelligence gathering activities.
  • Anybody involved in the process knows that it involves detailed interaction between the authorising Secretary of State, IPCO and its judicial commissioners.
  • Speaker tabled a reasoned amendment which was not selected.
  • Lord Macdonald criticised the Bill's lack of independent judicial oversight.
  • Concern over inclusion of 10 other public authorities like the Food Standards Agency and Environment Agency in the same context as serious intelligence agencies.
  • Concerns raised about the exclusion of pre-authorisation arrangements for severe criminal offences.
  • Questions whether organisations such as the Food Standards Agency should be included in the Bill's provisions.
  • Mentions personal experience with HM Customs and Excise overreach, which was later overridden by courts.
  • The Bill aims to place undercover operations on a statutory footing.
  • There are concerns about legitimising criminal conduct unless necessary and proportionate.
  • Section 9.3 of the code requires proper safeguards for material obtained through authorisation.
  • 12 months is mentioned as a period but its exact context is unclear from the given text.
  • Clause 1(5) sets out what will become section 29B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
  • Section 6 of the Human Rights Act makes it clear that public authorities may not act in a way incompatible with a convention right, including the right to life and the right not to be tortured.
  • Criminal conduct authorization requires belief that it is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (5), proportionate, and that arrangements exist satisfying requirements imposed by order made by the Secretary of State.
  • The Bill has no limit on the type of crimes that can be authorised if the agent believes the action is proportionate.
  • The arrangements for operational oversight and post-operational accountability are weaker than those for phone tapping or law enforcement searches.
  • The Bill could potentially apply outside the UK, including in Ireland.
  • There was a continuing investigation into the agent known as Stakeknife involving serious crimes sanctioned by British security agencies.
  • The Bill seeks to place existing practice on a clear statutory footing.
  • Concerns have been raised by Unite the union, Privacy International, Reprieve, and others.
  • Covert agents could potentially be licensed to kill under this legislation.
  • The Bill provides legal basis for undercover agents to infiltrate criminal groups.
  • 27 terrorist attacks have been prevented through interception and infiltration activities.
  • Scrutiny mechanisms include the double lock, Investigatory Powers Commissioner, ISC oversight, and the tribunal.
  • The Bill empowers various organisations including the Environment Agency and Department of Health and Social Care.
  • The MP raises concerns about potential mission creep within Departments.
  • The scrutiny period for the Bill is scheduled for Thursday week with limited time for detailed discussion.
  • The Bill seeks to put on a statutory footing activities involving breaches of law.
  • Safeguards in the Bill include authorisation by trained officers, oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and accountability to the Intelligence and Security Committee.
  • Reports of widespread sexual abuse during covert operations are concerning.
  • The Bill provides detail on training for authorising officers.
  • In 2016, the College of Policing published "Undercover policing: Authorised Professional Practice" guidance.
  • There is a 70-page code of practice accompanying the Bill.
  • Pat Finucane, an Irish lawyer in Belfast, was murdered by loyalist paramilitaries with British security service complicity.
  • In 2010, it emerged that for 40 years, Britain's police had spied on over 1,000 political groups, predominantly left-wing and anti-racist groups.
  • The Bill allows state agents to commit crimes such as torture, murder, and sexual violence without prohibition.
  • Authorisation can be granted by a wide range of agencies including the Competition and Markets Authority, Gambling Commission, and Environment Agency.
  • There are no provisions for warrants or independent judicial approval for authorising serious crimes.
  • Since March 2017, security services have thwarted 27 terror attacks.
  • In 2018, covert human intelligence sources helped disrupt over 30 threats to life, leading to numerous arrests and the seizure of 3,000 kg of class A drugs and over 50 firearms.
  • The Bill is certified as compliant with the Human Rights Act.
  • World-leading investigatory powers regime exists in few other countries, if any.
  • Authorising officers are highly trained and must follow clear guidance.
  • Investigatory Powers Commissioner can inspect public authorities at a frequency of his choosing and publish results annually.
  • The Bill aims to provide safeguards and independent oversight for covert human intelligence sources (CHIS).
  • Economic wellbeing is one of the statutory purposes for which covert investigatory powers may be deployed.
  • The Food Standards Agency uses CHIS to combat food crime within supply chains.
Assessment & feedback
Summary accuracy