Key Facts

• Kevan Jones wrote to Mr Speaker about new clause 6.
• The Chairs of the Committee have been contemplating the matter for some time.
• The decision on whether the new clause is in scope has different views among learned authorities.
• Clause 28 asserts that an officer, as well as a corporate body, is guilty of an offense if it is attributable to the officer’s consent, connivance or neglect.
• Subsection (5) allows the Secretary of State to make regulations through secondary legislation to improve the clause.
• The Law Commission provided a hypothetical example involving an IT services company headquartered in a foreign state with managed service contracts for UK departments.
• Clause 31 provides power to the court to exclude the public from any part of proceedings under national security concerns.
• The decision to exclude the public will be made by the court, not the prosecution.
• Closed-material proceedings are not granted by this clause.
• The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 has been in effect since receiving Royal Assent until December 31, 2020.
• Only 24 individuals were served with TPIM notices between the act's enactment and December 31, 2020.
• In 2020, all but one of the TPIM subjects were members of ALM—al-Muhajiroun, linked to several terrorist attacks in the UK.
• STPIMs are unlikely to become a tool of first resort due to their resource-intensiveness and complexity.
• North Korean hackers stole almost $400 million (approximately £291 million) of digital assets from cryptocurrency platforms in at least seven attacks in the previous year.
• Kevan Jones supports the measures as an extra weapon against hostile state intervention.
• Jones questions how STPIMs will be used in practice and for what duration.
• He expresses some sympathy with concerns about the use of polygraphs, suggesting legal justification is needed if they are to be included.
• Kevan Jones is questioning the use of polygraph tests in relation to STPIMs.
• The Minister clarified that polygraph results cannot be used as evidence in prosecutions.
• There are concerns about how defence lawyers might use or challenge polygraph test information.
• The Minister will write a letter to the Committee regarding polygraph test safeguards.
• STPIMs are measures of last resort in lieu of criminal convictions.
• Cryptocurrencies are becoming outdated but remain a focus for hostile state activity.
• The Minister provides examples of how Special Temporary Preventive Investigative Measures (STPIMs) could be applied in various scenarios.
• STPIMs would be used when prosecution is not viable due to sensitive evidence or lack of testimony from victims.
• The Government prioritizes normal criminal procedures over STPIMs.
• Clause 33 sets out conditions for imposing STPIMs.
• Condition A requires the Secretary of State to reasonably believe the individual has been involved in foreign power threat activity.
• The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, suggested that 'reasonably believes' is similar to 'the balance of probabilities'.
• The Minister argues against lowering the standard from 'reasonable belief' due to the nature of foreign state intelligence operatives.
• Amendment 56 seeks to change the extension period from four to two occasions.
• The amendment aims to restrict Part 2 notices to a maximum of two years after initial issuance, reflecting concerns about indefinite restrictions on individuals' liberty.
• Lord Carlile QC and Lord Anderson's reports highlight the need for balanced measures that do not extend indefinitely without new evidence.
• Clause 34 provides for one-year initial period and a five-year total limit for STPIM notices.
• STPIMs can be extended up to four times if conditions A, C, and D are met.
• The notice is reviewed every quarter.