Key Facts

• Amendment 5 adds a provision to clause 7 of the National Security Bill.
• The amendment covers land or building in the UK and Sovereign Base Areas owned or controlled by intelligence services such as the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, and GCHQ.
• These sites are used for functions of the respective intelligence agencies.
• Amendments make provision for sites used by the intelligence services to be designated as prohibited places.
• Clause 7 simplifies the definition of prohibited places, covering Crown land and vehicles important for UK defence.
• The Secretary of State can designate additional sites or vehicles under clause 8 if necessary to protect UK safety and interests.
• Clause 7 defines a prohibited place for the purposes of clauses 4 to 8.
• Clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to declare additional sites as prohibited places through secondary legislation.
• Stakeholders raised concerns during consultations that these powers could be used to stifle legitimate investigations or mark places serving unpopular government policies.
• Clause 7 defines a “prohibited place” related to Crown land used for extraction of metals, oil or minerals for UK defence purposes.
• Government amendment 5 identifies military areas or bases but does not include foreign sites under UK control due to jurisdictional difficulties.
• The Bill includes safeguards and case law definitions to ensure the necessity for national security when designating places.
• Clause 9 allows a constable to designate a cordoned area around a military aircraft or related equipment if it is expedient for securing such items.
• The initial cordon duration can be up to 14 days, with an extension possible up to 28 days total under clause 10.
• Clause 11 provides the police with enforcement powers including requiring individuals not to enter cordoned areas and arranging for vehicle removal.
• Maximum time period for a cordon zone is 14 days.
• Clause addresses gaps identified during the F-15 aircraft accident in Lincolnshire in 2015.
• Provisions currently apply only to military and foreign aircraft.
• Clause 12 introduces a new bespoke offense for state-sponsored sabotage.
• Subsection (3) outlines various ways in which sabotage can manifest, including cyber attacks leading to physical disruption.
• The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is noted as being long overdue for an update due to the evolving nature of cyber threats.
• Clause 12 proposes an offence for sabotage that prejudicially affects UK safety and interests.
• Sabotage can be conducted through cyber-means or physical actions by agents of foreign states.
• The clause applies whether the saboteur is in the UK or abroad, targeting assets located anywhere.
• Clause 13 creates a new general offence of foreign interference.
• Someone who behaves recklessly but whose intention to aid a foreign intelligence service cannot be proven would not commit an offence under this clause.
• Government amendment 9 makes foreign interference a priority offence in the 'Online Safety Act'.
• The speaker supports an independent annual review of all powers in the Bill through new clause 2.
• The amendment seeks to amend a Bill still on the Floor of the House.
• Clause 12 was recently approved with recklessness included as part of the offence.
• Clause 13 does not include recklessness in the same way.
• Clause 13 criminalises conduct that interferes with UK institutions, public functions, and political processes.
• The offence includes a foreign power condition, intention to cause specific effects, and meeting one of three conditions (A, B, or C).
• Amendment 9 links the foreign interference offence to the Online Safety Bill to combat state-sponsored disinformation online.
• The reviewer will assess the extent of foreign interference in elections.
• Reviews must be conducted every 12 months starting from when section 13 comes into force.
• Reports must be submitted to the Secretary of State and laid before Parliament.
• Clause 13 aims to provide increased penalties where existing electoral offences meet the 'foreign power condition'.
• For relevant offences from the Representation of the People Act 1983, maximum sentences range from two to seven years.
• For offences under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, maximum sentences are up to four years.
• The Centre for Strategic and International Studies report highlights cyber-attacks on Polish and German election systems in 2014 and 2015.
• Russian entities created fake social media accounts ahead of Finnish parliamentary elections to spread misinformation.
• Russia’s attempts to undermine UK democracy are expected to increase with its belligerence.
• The Intelligence and Security Committee recommended MI5 as the primary operational body for protecting electoral processes.
• Amendment 10 adds offences under paragraphs 1 through 5A and 26(2) of Schedule 9 to the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962.
• Amendment 11 amends section 105, 106, 108, 111, 112, and 118 of the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962 to ensure offences related to foreign interference are tried only on indictment.
• The amendments relate to clause 14 of the National Security Act 2022.
• Preparatory conduct can lead to life imprisonment even if no completed offence is committed.
• The amendment suggests that preparatory conduct must materially contribute to the offence.
• Concerns are raised about overly broad definitions of preparatory conduct leading to unintended consequences.
• Clause 15 aims to tackle preparatory activities by those who seek to harm the UK.
• Offences include obtaining or disclosing protected information, trade secrets, and entering prohibited places for prejudicial purposes.
• Those caught could face up to life imprisonment.
• The offences under clause 15 are designed differently from other offences.
• Clause 15 seeks to raise the threshold of proof for preparatory acts that pose a significant risk to national security.
• An example given is a security guard leaving a door open to facilitate access into a prohibited place by a hostile actor, which would be considered a preparatory act.