Key Facts

• Carl Miller and Sam Armstrong provided evidence regarding state threats and online influence operations.
• Carl Miller emphasized that the problem is not primarily about disinformation but includes amplification of truths over others and manipulation of identities and reasons for engagement.
• Sam Armstrong highlighted the broader nature of Chinese Communist party interference, involving individuals who may not see themselves as operatives of a foreign intelligence state.
• The Bill allows broad powers for security services to address certain offences.
• Carl Miller discusses the rise in companies selling social media manipulation services, such as fake followers and positive comments.
• There are concerns about state-backed activities using these services and targeting open-source communities like Wikipedia.
• Researchers struggle with clear attribution of foreign interference on social media platforms.
• Facebook took down accounts linked to every mainstream political party during the last Indian election.
• China's approach to information operations involves building close relations with influential individuals rather than direct disinformation campaigns.
• The Australian foreign influence transparency register system is cited as an example.
• Carl Miller recommends expanding the intelligence picture by integrating social media intelligence within the national strategic intelligence picture.
• Current legislation may not be sufficient alone to address international cyber-crime due to jurisdictional issues.
• The Government tabled an amendment to make “foreign interference” a priority offence in the Online Safety Bill.
• Platforms like TikTok have limited or no data availability for researchers, while Facebook and Twitter provide some level of data access.
• Defence intelligence has been publishing daily information during the Ukrainian war that counters many foreign interference problems.
• The Electoral Commission does not have an intelligence function but offers advice on electoral law and finance to law enforcement upon request.
• There is only one notification from MI5 regarding foreign interference in the UK's political finance system, which Edwards acknowledges as a matter that should not be taken lightly.
• Current offences involving foreign state powers are handed over to law enforcement by the Electoral Commission under existing processes.
• The Electoral Commission does not have intelligence functions, receiving information rather than creating or analysing it.
• Political finance regime focuses on registered political parties, third-party campaigners, candidates, and those with donation-reporting obligations.
• Digital imprints are required for regulated political material produced by political parties, third-party campaigners, and candidates.
• Professor Ciaran Martin served on the board of GCHQ from 2014 to 2020.
• The legislation aims to criminalise assisting foreign intelligence services in the UK, even remotely.
• Key threats come from Russia, China, and Iran.
• The Chinese Government extracted over 20 million security clearance records from the US Office of Personnel Management in 2015.
• The breach involved data on everyone who applied for a security clearance from the US Federal Government between 2000 and 2014.
• France's approach to disinformation during the 2017 election included casting doubt on the authenticity of information suspected to be tampered with by foreign intelligence services.
• Professor Ciaran Martin was a witness discussing the National Security Bill.
• Dr Nick Hoggard led the Protection of Official Data project at the Law Commission.
• Professor Penney Lewis is the criminal law commissioner at the Law Commission.
• The National Security Bill implements part of the Law Commission’s report on espionage offences.
• There are minor differences in the implementation but they are considered natural during legislative drafting.
• Clause 8 gives the Secretary of State powers to designate places as prohibited to protect UK safety or interests.
• Rich Owen represents the views of the legal profession regarding the proposed foreign influence registration scheme.
• Legal professional privilege is an ancient common-law right dating back over 400 years.
• The Law Society regards provisions for delaying access to a solicitor and notifying family members as proportionate.
• Rushanara Ali mentions hypothetical scenarios involving disclosure of sensitive information by former KGB officers meeting with Foreign Secretaries.
• Professor Penney Lewis explains that clause 3 of the Bill covers offences outside their original recommendations for espionage.
• The Law Commission conducted a comprehensive review starting in 2015, involving consultations and stakeholder meetings.
• Poppy Wood leads UK public policy for Reset.tech, a philanthropic organisation focusing on digital threats to democracy.
• The session is scheduled until around 4:20 pm.
• Poppy Wood refers to the ISC report from 2020 on Russia, noting the issue of co-ordinated disinformation and state-backed interference.
• The Free Scotland 2014 campaign was backed by Russian and Iranian actors using social media to destabilize the Union in 2014.
• Carnegie UK or another group has suggested that illegal content should mean content for which a provider has 'reasonable grounds to believe' it amounts to a relevant offence.
• Disinformation is difficult to define due to its shapeshifting nature.
• The Online Safety Bill addresses some aspects but lacks provisions on co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour and disinformation.
• There should be transparency and cross-Government involvement, including industry, civil society, journalists, and researchers.
• 75% of counter-terrorism speech identified as AI on platforms like Facebook.
• Poppy Wood discusses transparency concerns regarding public posts on social media platforms.
• Encryption is highlighted as an important tool with benefits for security services.
• Russia Today has been resurrected multiple times on social media under different names.
• The ISC and Law Commission recommend formal procedures for whistleblowing within intelligence agencies.
• Article 19 and Index on Censorship have reviewed the impact of the National Security Bill on journalism.
• Clause 23 disappplies provisions of the Serious Crime Act 2007 relating to encouraging or assisting crimes overseas.
• There is an existing regime under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 that already protects intelligence officers for acts authorised by a Minister in furtherance of their duties.
• Clause 23 insulates individuals from criminal liability for actions taken within the UK that may encourage or assist offences overseas.
• Clause 23 of the National Security Bill aims to protect ministers from criminal liability for actions assisting or encouraging crimes overseas.
• The Intelligence Services Act 1994 provides protection to intelligence officers through section 7 authorisations.
• The Serious Crime Act 2015 includes a reasonableness defence under section 50.
• Rushanara Ali thanked the witness on behalf of the Committee.
• The session concluded without further discussion or proposals.