Acknowledged the process for gathering and presenting intelligence but noted that specific content of leaked documents remains classified. Emphasised importance of vetting processes and compartmentalisation within MOD to limit access appropriately while allowing quick decision-making in an information age.

First, I thought I was clear in my initial answer that the Secretary of State is in Washington for a briefing to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that was requested in December and scheduled in January. It is fortuitous that he is there to discuss these matters in addition, but it would be inaccurate to say that he is there because of what happened last week. The right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) asks about previous incidents where the UK MOD has been responsible for leaks. I agree with him that it happens too often, but every time it happens, reviews are put in place and lessons are learned in terms of both the way that information is handled digitally and—because this was the case last year—the way that documents are removed from the building. On the former, there has been a wide-ranging and robust effort to assure the digital security of documents and to ensure that all users of secret and above systems are aware of the way that those systems should properly be used, and of how it should not even be attempted to move information from one system to the other. On physical documents, the Secretary of State put in place random bag searches at MOD main building immediately following the leak of hard documents last year, and those searches remain in place now. The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to observe that some of those documents have, since their apparent leaking, apparently been manipulated for various misinformation and disinformation purposes. That is why it is important to qualify that colleagues should be suspicious not only of the original content, but of the different versions that are in circulation subsequently, because they have been manipulated for various means. He is of course right to flag his concern, which mirrors our concern, about any force protection implications from such leaks. That was indeed our first concern, and the chief of joint operations was able quickly to reassure us that all those involved in the protection of diplomatic mission in Ukraine are not compromised in any way by the leaks—nor are any of those involved in the wider support for Ukraine and the wider continent beyond. I do not think that there is any impact on the Ukrainian plans for the offensive. In fact, as the right hon. Gentleman will have seen in the reporting of those, there has been a degree of amplification from the Ukrainians around some of the casualty statistics—I make no comment on the accuracy of the figures being pumped. Indeed, there is reporting that those figures have been manipulated by both sides to tell their story. But I am pretty confident that the Ukrainians are intending to stick to their plan and go for it. I do not have the information today on precisely how many breaches there have been, but I will write to him.

Thank you very much indeed, Mr Speaker; I value the friendship and counsel of both the current and the previous Select Committee Chair, so I think that you have said it all.

I note the concern of the hon. Gentleman and of my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East, the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee. We will ensure that any matters that can be exposed to them relating to this are exposed.

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right: these leaks, as unfortunate as they are, only benefit one group of people, and that is our competitors and adversaries in the world who mean us harm. Whatever heroic intentions those responsible for these leaks may think they have, they are wrong. They risk the safety of our armed forces, and they compromise the work that we and our allies are doing around the world to stand up to the challenge to the rules-based international order that we so strongly believe in.

In the interests of not only expectation management but accuracy, I will say to the right hon. Gentleman that I will ensure we do all that we are allowed to do and that the Committee is serviced with whatever is releasable, accepting, of course, that the content that has been leaked is US content, which might mean that that is very difficult for us to do.

I certainly can. A very important theme we have learned over the last year is that the way in which we own the narrative and counter disinformation is almost every bit as important as the physical reality of the battle on the ground, so this is an important part of our work on the Command Paper refresh.

I would fully expect it to be, but perhaps I can take the hon. Gentleman’s question away, ask it of the Department and write to him, so that we can both have confidence that my expectation is well founded.

As the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey), set out, there have been occasions when we reside in a glass house on these matters, so I am reluctant to throw stones at any other Department.

The Secretary of State has briefed the House on that incident already. I am not going to offer any discussion on the version of events presented in the leak.

There are two issues here. First, I do not believe this leak will have any consequences for Ukraine's spring offensive; they will proceed with their plan successfully. Second, while I am willing to share what we can with the ISC on processes and reviews within the MOD, much of this information is not ours to share as it relates to leaks from other sources.

I am happy to make that undertaking. As we conclude our internal reviews, if there is further information to offer to the House, we will share it appropriately.

We do not draw boundaries based on seniority for shared information. Information goes where it is needed rather than wanted. However, there are strict controls to ensure information is compartmentalised and only seen by those intended.

The MOD’s process for accessing top-secret information is rigorous and involves extensive background checks. While I cannot detail this exact process publicly, I and other ministerial colleagues are confident in it.

While I am invited to reflect on some content from the leaks, as I have said, I will not do so.

Troops on the ground likely became aware as it broke in news. For force protection and emotional support, tactical measures are taken locally, and the mission safely continues with the confidence that those who serve will carry on.