Questioned whether there should be a right for victims of UK complicity with foreign powers to access information about mistreatment they have suffered.

Suggested limiting the number of Secretaries of State who could play a role previously held exclusively by the Prime Minister to those with warranting powers.

Welcomed Government's acceptance of ISC recommendation but questioned why they are not accepting other proposals, particularly that the Prime Minister should be informed after a delegation takes place. Raised concerns about the broad definition of 'wellbeing' and lack of judicial oversight for internet connection records.

Asked if the Home Secretary would undertake to look closely at any correspondence that might be sent by the Joint Committee on Human Rights following their scrutiny of the Bill. Raised concerns about potential surveillance of trade unions.

Supported reforms to ensure that frameworks are kept up-to-date with evolving threats, expressing concern about companies like Meta and Apple rolling out technologies without safeguards.

Asked for reassurance that the broadening of bulk data collection without specific dates will not be used for fishing expeditions, highlighting need to ensure privacy protection for ordinary citizens.

Asked about the review of memorandum of understanding between ISC and Government, noting its importance given the nature of the provisions in question.

Asked for encouragement from the Home Secretary to have the Prime Minister go before the Intelligence and Security Committee at the soonest opportunity.

Provided context that ISC had routine meetings with Prime Ministers until 2014, highlighting the importance of such scrutiny.

Cooper emphasises that any government's primary responsibility is to ensure national security, defending against terrorism, extremism, and serious crime. She acknowledges the cross-party collaboration required for effective legislation and pays tribute to the work of Lord Anderson in reviewing these areas. Cooper supports the necessity of updating the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 due to rapidly evolving technological threats such as child abuse, terrorism, and organised crime. She highlights the importance of strong legal frameworks with proper oversight and robust safeguards against misuse or abuse of powers by intelligence agencies. Cooper also recognises the need for measures within the Bill like bulk datasets to keep pace with technological changes but stresses that these must be balanced with ensuring privacy protections remain in place.

Supports the Bill but raises concerns about Clause 15, suggesting it should come with additional scrutiny from a judicial commissioner due to its significant widening of powers. Argues that collecting data on many internet services over long periods can involve innocent individuals and requires oversight.

Expresses serious concerns about Clause 15, arguing it represents a significant expansion of already wide powers by international standards. Raises privacy and human rights risks and fears that these invasive powers are being handed to agencies not because they are necessary but convenient.

Supports Stuart McDonald's concern about a legal misunderstanding in clause 2 and clause 11(3), arguing that these clauses seem to be based on a misinterpretation of privacy rights according to European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.

Defends clause 2, stating it does not extend existing powers but merely enables a conversation with companies before any action is taken to maintain an existing standard. Clarifies that this is a continuation of power granted in 2016.

Mr. Hayes supports updating the Investigatory Powers Act to address current security threats but expresses concern about extending powers beyond national security and serious crime circumstances to a wider range of public bodies without clear safeguards or transparency.

Emphasised the importance of maintaining robust democratic oversight and safeguards for investigatory powers. Argued that while updates are necessary, they must be balanced with protections for Members' communications under a triple lock mechanism. Suggested limiting delegation of Prime Minister's powers to issuing warrants to Secretaries of State who also issue warrants.

Interjected, questioning the assumption that substitute approvals would automatically be reviewed by the Prime Minister and suggested including full oversight in the Bill.

Noted that the Wilson doctrine underpins the current protection for MPs' communications and stated that the clause is putting this on a statutory footing.

Lewis supports an expansion in investigatory powers for intelligence agencies but argues that oversight must be robustly established. He highlights concerns over clause 14, which restores investigatory powers to unidentified public bodies without sufficient safeguards. Lewis also emphasises the need for independent parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of annual reports detailing bulk personal datasets.

Kevan Jones argues that clause 2 of the Bill fails to provide sufficient oversight for changes in bulk personal datasets. He suggests that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner should be notified when new data sets are added, even if only through a one-line email notification. This is essential to prevent mission creep and ensure compliance with democratic safeguards.

[INTERVENTION] Thomas Tugendhat clarifies that he was not in the Government during a previous reference to government actions. This intervention does not provide a clear position on clause 2 but suggests some context.

Expresses concern that Clause 15 allows for target discovery rather than target development, which could lead to fishing expeditions. He emphasises the importance of proportionate surveillance and raises concerns about infringing on privacy rights.

Supports the Bill in principle but asks for clarification regarding notification requirements for operators, end-to-end encryption issues, and the storage of online search history. He highlights concerns about privacy rights and data security.

Supports the Bill as a necessary update to ensure legal frameworks keep pace with technological changes. Emphasises the need for robust safeguards and constant review of notices regime. Highlights potential conflicts of law arising from clause 17 and asks for feedback on international partnerships. Questions Prime Minister’s availability for Intelligence and Security Committee meetings.

Raised concerns about changes to 'lawful authority' in clause 12 regarding published data, questioning whether private messages would be covered.

Asked questions about transparency safeguards in the Bill, highlighting concerns over potential intrusions into privacy and the need for robust oversight mechanisms.

Inquired about the designation of individuals by the Prime Minister, noting that a previous Bill allowed different forms of oversight for specific agencies. He supported the Government's approach to limit those designated but sought clarity on specific cases.

Expressed concern about the potential misuse of bulk data and suggested that prior judicial authorisation for certain intercept-related requests would offer better protection. He proposed a simple mechanism to inform stakeholders of Investigatory Powers Commissioner changes.

Supported the Government's approach, noting that internal authorisation for D2 operations should still be subject to rigorous scrutiny within intelligence agencies.

Requested assurance regarding full disclosure of individual bulk personal datasets retained and examined, seeking clarity on current exclusions in reporting to the ISC and IPCO.

Highlighted the importance of balancing security with privacy rights for constituents. Emphasised the need for strict oversight and protection against intrusive powers.