Ms. Smith expressed concern over the lack of detail in the Bill regarding Great British Railways' policies and procedures, stating that it leaves the industry in the dark on mission-critical issues. She argued for greater transparency, checks, and balances to prevent GBR from favouring its own services over those of other operators. She also highlighted the importance of independent oversight by the ORR to maintain a fair and transparent access framework.

The amendments seek to make changes to GBR’s access and use policy. They aim to ensure transparency, prevent conflicts of interest, provide a right of appeal, promote high-quality service and competition, delay implementation for scrutiny, and mandate consultation with all affected operators.

Expresses concern about the absence of private operators on the mandatory list. She believes the amendment is crucial to keep open access as a fixture in GBR’s future rather than an optional extra, ensuring industry certainty and encouraging private investment.

Proposes amendments aiming to ensure Great British Railways considers views of open access and freight providers when preparing capacity plans, aims to reduce GBR's ability to prioritise its own operations, ensures decisions meet key performance indicators, retains sufficient capacity for rail freight targets, publishes statements explaining decisions not to grant network access.

Ms Smith argues that clause 63 of the Railways Bill does not provide a level playing field for open access operators. It prioritises GBR's own services, making it difficult to assess whether an open access application is better use of capacity than GBR’s operational or future plans.

Mr Robertson questions if the restrictive nature of clause 63 stems from a desire by the Government to limit open access opportunities, despite official statements supporting competition and innovation in rail services.

Supports the intention of amendments to strike a better balance in the Bill between GBR wanting to protect its interests and recognising valid competing objectives elsewhere. Proposes new clause 56 requiring GBR to explore centralised train planning and auctioning, highlighting potential benefits for competitive pricing on high-revenue routes.

Explains the Government's position that clauses 60 and 63 aim to provide clarity in capacity allocation, ensuring a single body (GBR) can make strategic decisions about infrastructure use. Emphasises GBR’s role in creating an infrastructure capacity plan based on best-use assessment without unfairly pushing out other operators.

Raises concern that the drafting of the Bill and clause 63 could inevitably lead to squeezing out open access and competition, regardless of Government intentions.

Ms Smith expressed a desire to press some amendments to a vote despite not supporting amendment 80. She argued for transparency and clarity in GBR’s access decisions but ultimately decided against pressing her amendments to a vote.

Mr Mather moved an amendment ensuring that changes to the working timetable can be agreed in advance and proposed new clause 52 requiring public consultation on train frequency. He argued against embedding responsibility for train frequency in Government, instead supporting GBR’s empowered role.

Supported amendments to clauses 61 and 62 focusing on fair processes for developing timetables. Also proposed amendment to ensure GBR retains sufficient capacity across infrastructure.

Spoke in support of new clause 52, which would introduce a duty on train frequency requiring public consultation and binding GBR to deliver agreed service frequencies. Highlighted the need for rural areas to be heard.

Opposed amendments proposed by Rebecca Smith, arguing that a unified system under GBR would ensure an achievable and reliable timetable without conflicts of interest.

Turner suggests that higher charges could help recoup costs for infrastructure improvements, but Rebecca Smith argues this lacks clarity regarding multiple users of the same infrastructure and raises concerns about the impact on fares.

The Conservative spokesperson questions the judicial review process and suggests that Amendment 84 is a probing amendment to hear the Minister’s response. He also raises concerns about natural justice and fairness regarding charging schemes due to GBR failures.

The Liberal Democrats are interested in amendments that ask questions about transparency and accountability for how the access charging regime will work. They also express interest in hearing from both the Minister and the Conservative spokesperson on phantom paths.

The Conservative amendment 83 attempts to remove GBR’s ability to charge higher than normal rates but needs transparency criteria for such decisions. They are interested in how the Government intends to make this process transparent.

Mather confirms that the charging regime broadly replicates today's system, providing familiar charges and discounts for industry transition. He emphasises GBR’s obligations under public law duties, including fairness and non-discrimination in actions and decision-making. He explains why a reservation charge is important to encourage operators to use allocated capacity responsibly.

The amendment adds unnecessary layers of bureaucracy to industry process. Legislation already places high-level legal requirements on GBR for what it must include and consider and stipulates clear rights to appeal. Therefore, adding parliamentary process at this stage would achieve nothing other than unnecessary delay to implementing charges, to the detriment of the sector.

Clause 64 requires GBR to establish and publish a scheme setting out the charges that it will apply to operators that access and use its infrastructure. It will also allow GBR to levy reservation charges, otherwise known as no-show charges, if operators do not run trains as intended—for example, if a service does not arrive at all stations as planned as part of its allocated path in the timetable. The clause will require GBR to set charges at the cost that is directly incurred by GBR simply for running the service, such as incremental wear and tear on the tracks; that does not include contribution to the additional costs of maintaining and operating the railway. Under this provision, GBR will be able to charge higher than the cost directly incurred, provided that that does not exceed the amount that an efficient operator would be able to pay. To determine that amount, GBR will develop its own test of affordability in consultation with industry. To reassure the Committee, we expect it to use principles that are similar to or the same as those used today. The provision is therefore intended to work in practice as it does now. The clause will allow GBR to provide discounts where appropriate, in any circumstance, as is supported by the non-exhaustive list of examples in legislation. GBR will not charge its own services but, to ensure transparency and fairness, must provide sufficient information about the costs that would have been charged to its own passenger services, had they been subject to the schemes above. That is not because the costs of running those services will not be provided for—it will be, by the taxpayer—but because a track access charge transaction will not be used to cover those costs, since GBR will not have a contract with itself in the way it will with a third party. Finally, the clause allows any person aggrieved by a provision in the scheme, or any replacement or revision to it, to appeal to the ORR.