Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) 2026-02-05

The hon. Member proposed amendments addressing phantom trains and charging schemes based on GBR's responsibility for infrastructure failures. She argued that operators should not be penalised if they cannot operate due to GBR responsibilities or natural disasters, like the line getting closed.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State responded by stating that having one central body responsible for access and use of railways would avoid phantom train scenarios. He emphasised that GBR will not be able to raise charges in a way incompatible with statutory duties or targets, ensuring operators are protected.

The hon. Member proposed amendments related to freight targets and appeal processes for charging schemes. He argued that GBR should consider the impact of charges on rail freight growth targets, and the ORR should have power to revise schemes if fairness is an issue.

Proposes amendments to address unfairness in the current drafting where GBR can avoid paying compensation for disruption outside its control while all other operators remain responsible. Suggests that GBR should be treated like every other operator and face penalties or receive compensation when service disruptions occur due to factors beyond their control.

Welcomes the opportunity to address issues with schedule 4 and schedule 8 compensation for planned and unplanned disruption. Criticises current delay attribution schemes as inefficient, highlighting examples where delays are attributed based on arbitrary determinations of bird sizes. Supports retaining a degree of compensation scheme but questions if amendment 85 is necessary without clear circumstances.

Supports transparency in the attribution of delays, even if actual cash transfers do not occur. Proposes that a schedule of payments should be published to give the travelling public transparency on where challenges lie.

Acknowledges the performance scheme's goal to improve punctuality, reliability and overall service quality for passengers and freight operators through incentives such as compensation, bonuses and penalties. Supports the clause as it applies to GBR both in its capacity as a service operator and infrastructure manager.

Argar questions whether GBR will be able to set its own performance criteria, with no real oversight or binding adjudications from the ORR.

Smith highlights concerns about how disruption outside GBR’s control is defined and worries that operators might struggle to receive compensation in such cases. She also proposes an amendment to protect third-party operators from facing penalties for disruptions not their fault.

Mather reassures the Committee that GBR will consult industry partners and define clear demarcations of what is within or outside control, with the ORR providing impartial reviews and appeals. He explains why amendments are unnecessary as current provisions protect third-party operators.

The Minister's argument does not address accountability issues. Constituency MPs know the high judicial review threshold can be costly and burdensome for appealing decisions, suggesting it may set too high a bar.

GBR will be held accountable through legislation duties towards passengers and freight. The ORR has strong powers to dismiss appeals or remit decisions for reconsideration with legally binding directions. In serious scenarios, the ORR can substitute its own decision if there's a legal error.

Clause 67 establishes appeals against GBR decisions on judicial review terms but lacks express requirement to consult open access operators. Clause 68 limits the ORR’s remedies, preventing it from substituting its own decision unless there's an error of law.

The speaker emphasises concerns about Clause 68(1), (3)(a), and (4)(b) which restrict appeals to judicial review principles. They point out that these clauses limit the corrective power of oversight bodies such as ORR, and make it difficult for operators to challenge GBR decisions effectively. The speaker also references written evidence from the Rail Freight Group and FirstRail, highlighting issues related to monopolistic behaviour by GBR and lack of independent regulatory oversight.

The MP questions the justification for restricting appeals processes to judicial review principles alone. He argues that such a restriction is inconsistent with broader UK legal principles allowing for multi-tiered appeals systems in other sectors.

Argued that the Bill gives excessive power to the Secretary of State, reducing accountability and independent oversight. Proposes amendments to strengthen ORR's role in appeals against GBR access decisions. He believes this will protect independence, prevent political interference, and ensure fair, evidence-based judgments.

Supported Edward Morello’s amendments aimed at strengthening the ORR's role in appeals processes. She proposed several amendments to change how appeals are handled by allowing ORR more discretion, which were voted down but believed they would ensure fair and transparent regulation.

Represented the government's position in rejecting amendments aimed at reducing Secretary of State powers. He emphasised that current regulations allow for safeguarding effective operation while maintaining ORR’s independence. Keir defended the need for flexibility and coherence across railway networks, especially concerning cross-border services.

I wish to speak in support of amendment 146 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. Clause 71 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations allowing for the early termination of access agreements. We believe that this creates unnecessary uncertainty for train operators and passengers.

Clause 69 amends the Railways Act 1993 to except GBR or a subsidiary of GBR from the sections outlining the ORR’s powers on access and its corresponding duties. That change would prevent the ORR from making access decisions on infrastructure operated by GBR.

The provisions in the Bill for non-GBR operators are currently not fair or appropriate. Without clear access and use policies, it is difficult to secure private investment. GBR's role should be to drive industry forward by providing certainty about future operations.

Private sector innovation and investment have been crucial for the UK railway over 28 years. The current provisions in the Bill do not encourage further substantial investment due to concerns over Clause 71, which grants unusual powers to amend contracts between private operators and Network Rail/GBR without creating certainty for future investments.

The proposed changes in the Bill are necessary to establish GBR as the single decision maker responsible for optimizing railway use. Retaining ORR's role would continue inefficient practices, leading to delays and inefficiencies. Clause 71 provides a time-limited power to ensure smooth transition but includes safeguards to protect existing rights and contracts.

Supports amendment restricting Secretary of State's powers over operational matters in freight sidings and terminals. Argues against unnecessary political interference, emphasising the importance of stable and efficient operations managed by operators rather than ministers.

Critiques clause 72 for its potential to interfere with privately owned rail freight terminals. Expresses concern about undermining contract law and the risk of international investors withdrawing due to regulatory uncertainty. Supports amendments aimed at limiting Secretary of State's powers over customer and facility-owner freight sidings.

Comments on the nature of clause 72, agreeing with previous speakers' concerns about its drafting and potential unintended consequences for the rail industry.

Smith challenges the Minister's stance by pointing out real concerns raised by industry experts through written and oral evidence. She questions how the Government can dismiss these concerns when businesses are not reassured by the current Bill.

Morello expresses support for amendment 256 but has no further contributions on the specifics of its content, indicating a procedural move to press it to a vote.

Ms Smith proposed amendment 99 and sought a Division. She argued that the ORR should have broader auditing powers over GBR's statutory functions when undertaking its monitoring role, suggesting this would ensure more robust oversight of GBR’s performance.

Mr Mather moved amendment 271 and discussed clause 75. He argued that the ORR should not be able to impose fines on GBR for licence breaches as it would not align with the aim of maximising benefits from public ownership, potentially leading to a money-go-round between two public bodies.

Mr Glover questioned Mr Mather's proposal, expressing concern that without fines as an enforcement tool, the ORR would lose its ability to compel GBR to adhere to necessary improvements. He asked what would happen if GBR ignored legally binding improvement notices issued by the ORR.

Highlighted the structural conflict of interest in GBR writing rules and controlling capacity. Emphasised the need for an independent rail regulator.

Called for retaining ORR's independent authority, interested to see how transition of powers plays out, and emphasised enforceability concerns.

Asked the Government to listen to sector voices speaking against clause 75, suggesting its removal. Raised questions about why consumer protection should not apply to public bodies like GBR.

Defended the amendment aimed at aligning with section 57A of the Railways Act 1993, stating that it would lead to recycling of public funds. Emphasised accountability measures for GBR executives and argued against extreme speculation scenarios.

Questioned the circumstances under which not being transparent is in the public interest, highlighting concerns about transparency and the perception of public trust. Raised queries on timelines and commitments regarding publication of information from previous registers.