The Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill - Clause 14 and related amendments

MP Rosie Winterton moved several new clauses to ensure annual reporting on technology-enabled crime, prevent torture or inhumane treatment, protect MPs from interception, and introduce notification requirements for MPs. She also proposed amendments to clarify provisions regarding bulk personal datasets and align with existing communication data codes of practice.

Agrees that it is within the minister's purview to confirm conventions for the ISC. Looks forward to an assurance regarding the continuation of these constitutional duties.

Highlights the importance of non-partisan consideration of matters by the ISC. Discusses issues related to redaction in reports and the appearance of Prime Ministers before the Committee.

Emphasises that engagement with members of the ISC is non-partisan. Suggests that a meeting with the Prime Minister would be conducted without objection.

Notes concerns from tech companies but suggests consensus to protect society, acknowledging importance of administrative processes and societal protections.

Concerned about locking in an iterative process for oversight and regulation. Argues against new clause 2 on the basis of potential future evolution of technology engagement.

Highlights the need for clarity regarding the threshold for determining 'low or no expectation of privacy' in leaked documents and data. Expresses caution about defining this standard clearly to avoid absurd situations.

Davis expresses significant concerns about the expansion of surveillance powers over MPs, arguing it will undermine trust in parliamentary communications. He also highlights issues with bulk data collection and potential misuse of intelligence leading to torture.

[INTERVENTION] Hayes defends the previous Investigatory Powers Act, stating it received thorough scrutiny and is essential legislation used daily by security services and police. He criticises Davis for being contentious about the Bill.

Mr David Davis intervenes, highlighting concerns about redactions in ISC reports and the need for continually adapting to changing technology. He expresses regret over repeated breaches of promises made regarding 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment'.

Mr Thomas Tugendhat offers assurances about strengthening notification requirements in the code of practice to ensure the Prime Minister 'will' be notified, and agrees to specific oversight by IPCO on the regime.

Mr John Hayes acknowledges the balance between privacy and security but suggests regular reporting to IPCO as authorisations are made, offering iterative process reassurance.

Agrees with previous speaker's emphasis on the significant decision-making process involved in issuing warrants for interception of communications of Members of Parliament. Proposes a controlled group based on current responsibilities or previous experience to limit those who can make such decisions, beyond just receiving a briefing from Cabinet members. Also discusses part 4 of the Bill concerning product notification notices and suspensions pending review, suggesting three conditions: materiality threshold, no indefinite hold on product development, and an appeal mechanism for decisions preventing new products.

McDonald highlights concerns about the Bill extending powers beyond what is necessary and proportionate. He raises issues with judicial oversight for bulk personal datasets, internet connection records, and notices under clause 21. McDonald suggests strengthening ex post facto oversight by cancelling authorisations that do not comply with legal requirements and proposes removing reference to 'low' expectations of privacy altogether.

Wright intervenes to express concern that McDonald's proposed new subsection (4) would invalidate an entire category authorisation if one dataset is found to be incorrect, arguing this could undermine operational flexibility.

Mr. Thomas Tugendhat supports the Minister's position, clarifying that the powers granted to local authorities are restrictive and in line with existing legislation. He explains that these powers will be used infrequently and only as necessary for enforcement of serious crimes such as cigarette smuggling.

Mr. Kevan Jones seeks clarification on the extent of local authorities' access to communications data, ensuring that these powers will not be expansive and are used only for serious crimes as defined by the law.

Argues the importance of having Secretaries of State with experience or previous responsibility for warrantry to ensure proper oversight and protection of democracy. Requests the Security Minister to agree that those who may issue warrants should have relevant qualifications, expressing disappointment in the minister’s reluctance to make this final concession.

Supports Eagle's argument by highlighting the significance of having a Secretary of State act as the Prime Minister when issuing warrants. Emphasises that once such a decision is made, it cannot be rescinded, reinforcing the need for stringent qualifications.

Villiers supports updates to legislation and the rigorous legal framework for oversight of intelligence work. She expresses concern about clarity on organisation deployment of intrusive powers, welcomes tightening provisions on the triple lock, and raises issues with internet connection records under clause 15.

Laing wishes Jim Shannon a happy birthday before calling him to speak.

Shannon acknowledges the importance of national security but raises concerns about privacy and the impact on tech companies. He highlights specific criticisms from four tech firms regarding potential negative impacts on innovation, investment, and user rights.

Tugendhat defends the Bill, emphasising its careful preparation alongside the Intelligence and Security Committee. He addresses specific amendments, explaining why they cannot be accepted due to concerns about new Secretaries of State and legal clarity. Tugendhat asserts that removing clause 15 would hinder intelligence agencies' ability to detect threats and protect public safety.

Hayes intervenes, expressing concern about corporate organisations gathering and selling data without user consent. He supports a less permissive attitude towards these organisations.

Wright intervenes to discuss the practical implications of issuing notices under the Bill, suggesting that such actions could infringe on commercial liberties.

Jones challenges the argument about new Secretaries of State, asserting it is a weak point given the routine establishment of positions upon government change.

Expresses satisfaction that the Bill will pass, providing necessary powers to security services. Acknowledges colleagues' contributions and thanks civil servants for their work.

Thanks all who have contributed but expresses concern over some aspects of the Bill, such as judicial oversight being watered down. Feels there are not sufficient justifications for certain powers and believes these could be achieved through other means.

Supports the Third Reading of the Bill, emphasising its necessity to provide security services with necessary powers. Acknowledges constructive cross-party efforts and the hard work put in by civil servants.