UK Telecommunications

The review concluded that high-risk vendors should be excluded from safety-related and security-critical network functions in critical national infrastructure; limited to a minority presence up to 35% in other network functions, with tight restrictions. The Government will legislate to limit the presence of these vendors in UK networks, expecting their market share to reduce over time as diversification takes place.

I am pleased that the Government have finally set out the conclusions of the telecoms supply chain review in relation to high-risk offenders after far too long a period of dither and delay. A decision was required urgently so that everyone concerned can move forward. Our telecoms sector, businesses and households need clarity and certainty to move forward; leaks, rumour and confusion on this simply cannot continue. The safety and security of our critical national infrastructure is crucial... 5G will shape the economy of the future. Innovative technologies of the future rely on its development, and it must progress speedily. The Government’s original announcement that the UK would be a global leader in 5G was back in 2017. The Government also set a target of the majority of the population being covered by a 5G signal by 2027. In his statement, the Foreign Secretary committed to securing national coverage of gigabit-capable broadband by 2025. Those targets have to be met.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the considered questions he raises. He is right to do so. We have looked at this issue very carefully... As I set out in the statement, the Government recognise the imperative to diversify supply. That will involve UK operators making sure that more challengers can come into the market place. It could well involve—this is something we will want to look at—international co-operation with like-minded, close partners, so that we avoid ever having that shortfall of competition and diversity of supply in this country... The initial approach will be through guidance, as I explained in my statement. We are committed to bringing forward legislation as soon as possible, but we will make sure we have the robust enforcement to go with the rigorous regime that I set out.

I commend the Government for taking a decision that protects our national security but also recognises the interests of our economy. That is right for the UK, because it recognises the construction of our networks and our capabilities, and gives us the toughest regime in the world... Does he agree that it is essential that our Five Eyes partners—all our Five Eyes allies—be willing to work with us and other like-minded countries to ensure the market diversification that is in all our interests in the long term?

The Conservative party's decision to allow Huawei in the periphery of the 5G network is a result of short-termism and under-investment, prioritising low cost over security. This decision is criticised for being weak and unsafe given Chinese law mandating companies to cooperate with intelligence services.

The Secretary of State defends the government's decision as a result of thorough analysis, including telecoms supply chain review and security analysis by the National Cyber Security Centre. He argues that an outright ban on Huawei would not address security concerns effectively and would increase costs and delay 5G roll-out.

Questions if Huawei should be regarded as a private company given its links to the Chinese Communist state, asking for reassurances about safeguards against potential security threats from such an entity.

Welcomes the statement but asks for clarity on government plans regarding R&D investment and acquisition regulations for companies in the sector to mitigate Chinese influence.

Advocates for a ban of Huawei from UK networks due to its ties with the People’s Liberation Army and the 2017 law requiring it to take instructions from Chinese intelligence.

Critiques the statement for lacking detail, focusing on short-termism. Asks for guarantees that Huawei equipment can be swapped out and what is being done to support British telecoms equipment manufacturers.

Regrets the decision due to its implications on discouraging companies not operating under international norms. Agrees that measures must be taken to prevent similar situations in future.

Questions the distinction between core and periphery of the network, highlighting concerns regarding radio masts used for emergency services and search and rescue operations.

Deeply disappointed by the decision to allow Huawei a role in UK's future systems, questioning if China is now seen as a cyber-security threat.

Asked whether US administration linked trade deal potential with UK’s decision on Huawei.

Welcomed the statement balancing technological advantages and security challenges, highlighting collaboration with Five Eyes partners.

Concerned that the decision will strengthen Huawei's grip on the market, making it harder for competitors to enter.

Questioned how security can be guaranteed when software is updatable and technology evolves daily.

Expressed worry about the risk Huawei presents to national security, given its association with Chinese Communist Party.

Asked whether anxiety in Washington is primarily about Britain's ability to mitigate risks or giving a green light to others.

Inquired why the UK cannot develop its own network like Vietnam, instead of relying on high-risk vendors.

Asked for confirmation that Parliament will have a role in defining high-risk and non-high-risk vendors.

Expressed concern over Huawei’s access to university research and businesses, potentially leading to intellectual property theft.

Asked for clarity on the 35% restriction—whether it applies to new or existing market share.

Acknowledged the 35% market share cap for Huawei, emphasising the need to diversify supply from trusted companies. He stated that this decision will enhance national security and infrastructure resilience.

Congratulated the Government on their decision, believing it enhances digital infrastructure without compromising security. Supported 5G networks' benefits for businesses and individuals while avoiding a trade war with China.

Complimented Raab's serious approach to the issue and urged the Intelligence and Security Committee to review the decision properly, stressing the importance of reciprocity in relations with China.

Asked how the 35% rule will be managed over time as technology evolves.

Acknowledged a question that had already been asked by another member, without providing additional details.

Inquired about the use of Huawei’s technology in China and whether it involves any clandestine services.

Questioned the Government's decision to allow a high-risk vendor like Huawei, expressing concern over network resilience and integrity.

Emphasised the importance of not being distracted by one supplier and protecting supply networks from any vendors based on security considerations.

Asked about protections for sensitive data given that Huawei is deemed high-risk.

Referenced the oversight board’s criticism of Huawei's network issues in the UK, questioning whether there are credible plans to remedy them.

Critiqued the decision as a dangerous pact with the Chinese Communist Party and suggested that regulatory measures should precede allowing high-risk vendors like Huawei into 5G networks.

Questioned whether there will be a review of strategic national failures leading to the current situation with Huawei.

Suggested phasing the introduction of the share cap over several years to allow industry time to respond.

Emphasised the need for a swift response to security and investment challenges, proposed a phased approach with a cap on Huawei's involvement at 35%, aiming to diversify supply over time.

Questioned the feasibility of easing out high-risk vendors like Huawei due to market failure and raised concerns about future reliance on such vendors.

Highlighted the potential productivity gains from early adoption of 5G, questioning the impact of a delayed roll-out due to security concerns.

Pressed for an explanation behind the specific cap on Huawei's involvement and questioned the timescale for reducing reliance on high-risk vendors.

Asked about potential trade retaliation by China in response to a decision to ban Huawei outright, raising concerns over international relations.

Expressed confusion and concern over the decision, arguing that it undermines national security given the nature of 5G technology.

Asked for reassurances regarding the safety and security of digital infrastructure in rural areas as part of the roll-out plan.

Proposed that Huawei should bear costs associated with breaches of national security, advocating for strict contractual obligations.

Inquired about the political fallout from the decision and its impact on international relations with key allies and partners.

Suggested a government information campaign to address fears among constituents regarding technical oversight and regulatory powers.

Asked for assurance that the Government prioritises national security based on advice from security services, particularly concerning critical infrastructure.